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The telecommunications industry was long regarded to be one of "natural 
monopoly"l. Technological development has, however, changed the situation in the 
industry fundamentally: with the introduction of digital wireless telephony (also 
called "GSM2" or "second generation (2G),,3), competition could effectively be 
introduced into the industry, as the new networks rely on antennas instead of fixed 
cable networks. This made it possible, and in the presence of large numbers of 
subscribers necessary, to build multiple mobile telephone networks in one country. 
The presence of competition, and a completely new set of telephone usage instances 
made possible by small GSM handsets, created new market opportunities and 
business models in the telecommunications sector. The impact of this has been so 
strong that nowadays, there are more mobile telephone subscribers in South Africa 
than there are fixed-line telephone users4• 
Technological development has progressed even further, leading to a new generation 
of mobile telecommunication networks, commonly named "Third Generation (3G)" 
or UMTS5. These new networks will, once they are rolled out, be capable of much 
higher data transmission rates than current networks. Expectations in the industry are 
such that 3G networks, combined with even more sophisticated telephone handsets, 
will be able to offer consumers endless new uses of their mobile telephones. At this 
moment, it is stil1 unclear what the main uses of the bandwidth (i.e. data transmission 
capacities) of 3G networks will be. It is expected that a lot of new multimedia 
products (e.g. downloading music or videos from the internet), or services based on 
the location of the users, such as restaurant recommendations or city guides will be 
1 Natural Monopoly: a monopoly situation that is caused by the existence of very large fixed cost, 
which makes it wasteful to have more than one company servicing the market 
2 GSM: Global Standard for 
3 Analogue wireless telephony, at the time mostly used in cars due to its physical size, is largely 
regarded as "first generation" mobile telephony 
4 (2001), Phone power 











offered to consumers. In addition to consumer markets, there may be a lot of uses for 
companies, especially when employees do not always work in the same location. 
Third Generation mobile telephone networks need "slices" of the radio spectrum to 
operate. As the frequency band is limited, it is only possible to introduce a fairly small 
number of competitors into the market. Licenses to operate a 30 network thus hold a 
high economic value and have generated interest from different groups other than 
potential 3G network providers. 
Policy makers have shown interest in UMTS licensing due to the large value of the 
licenses and the possibilities for government revenue generation. Mathematical 
economists found this licensing exercise interesting, since it represents a high-value, 
non-monopoly franchise bidding exercise: there are no incumbents present in the 
market and companies do not bid for a monopoly. Hence this posed a possibility of 
applying a comparatively new method of license allocation more extensively, namely 
auctions. These promised a more efficient allocation process than the old concept of 
"beauty contests", which used to dominate licensing. 
Like the telecommunications industry, South Africa has experienced fundamental 
change in the recent past, albeit in a very different manner. The change from an 
apartheid government to democracy introduced a new set of values in policy making. 
Government is seeking to reduce the large income differences between different 
groups in society and between different regions of the country with a wide range of 
empowerment and redistribution programs. 
The large value of 30 licenses and the unique situation of the South African economy 
raise the question of how their allocation should be dealt with. 
Recent developments, especially those in European economies, have brought a lot of 
new insights into the opportunities and challenges of radio spectrum licensing. As the 
licensing processes developed, difficulties associated with each stage emerged. It is 
thus the main thrust of this paper to examine recent experience and to tie this in with 
theories of licensing. This creates an analytic framework that allows the analysis of 
the South African UMTS licensing process in view of special policy variables that 
have not been significant elsewhere. 
In section 2, I will give an outline of the macroeconomic and telecommunications 











been used in the past. Section 3 will be concerned with a review of theory and 
experiences of the use of auctions in telecomm licensing. 
Section 4 will then investigate the issues of the South African licensing situation, 











2 South African Macroeconomic and 
Telecommunications Policy Objectives 
As discussed in section 1, most licenses have thus far been allocated in highly 
developed countries. South Africa, on the other hand, in its role as a developing 
country, holds a different set of challenges and objectives for the licensing process. 
Naturally, policy objectives will have a strong influence on the licensing process, as 
its design will reflect what policy makers wish to achieve with it. Hence it is vital to 
analyse the objectives pursued by the government on the macroeconomic level, the 
telecommunications level and with respect to state asset privatisation. 
South Africa's situation results from the combination of legacies, which need to be 
addressed in license design, and policy objectives, which may be further reaching than 
in other countries. Mechanisms used in other less unique economic environments may 
thus fail in this context, making a careful adaptation to local circumstances vital. 
2.1 General Policy Objectives 
With the election of the ANC into government, there was a major change in the 
direction of macroeconomic policy. In the preamble of the first macroeconomic 
strategy formulated, the Reconstruction and Development Program6, Nelson Mandela 
states the objective of macroeconomic policy to be to "effectively address the 
problems of poverty and the gross inequality evident in almost all aspects of South 
African society." The general aim of redistribution was aided by a series of 
macroeconomic measures aimed at growth and stability: deficit reduction, an increase 
in capital expenditure, reprioritisation to avoid an increase in deficits and human 
resource development. 
In 1996, a more precise program was formulated with GEAR7. Here, the measures for 
an increase in the long run growth rate were more precisely identified and unified in 
what the paper calls a "multi-pronged approach". These included: 
• A budget reform to strengthen redistribution 
6 Republic of South Africa (1994), The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development p.4 












• A fiscal deficit reduction programme 
• An export oriented exchange rate policy 
• Tight monetary policy to avoid inflation 
• A reduction in tariffs to reduce input prices 
• Tax incentives to promote private sector investment 
• Infrastructure programmes 
• Labour market flexibility 
• Stimulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
• And state asset restructuring 
An important aspect of GEAR was the restructuring of state assets, which had four 
objectives: firstly, proceeds from privatisations could be used for deficit reduction 
purposes, hence giving the government more budgetary flexibility whilst maintaining 
a sustainable PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing Requirement). Secondly, state asset 
restructuring was to free up capital for social infrastructure projects, aimed at the 
eradication of apartheid inequalities. Thirdly, introducing the private sector to the 
services was understood to improve efficiency of services. Lastly, asset restructuring 
was aimed at job creation downstream through increases in productivity and 
subsequently improved growth prospects. 
Although not completely intuitive, 30 licensing does represent a form of state asset 
privatisation: radio spectrum designated for the use of UMTS is a scarce resource to 
which the government holds the rights. The process of assigning usage rights thus 
represents a form of transferring an economic resource from the public to the private 
sector. Privatisation policy thus becomes integral to the South African licensing 
process. 
Ayogu and Hodge8 note that "by 1999, the government had only managed to sell a 
30% equity stake in the telecommunications operator, the airports company and off-
load a small airline, Sun Air." Furthermore, they note that the telecommunications 
8 Ayogu and Hodge (2000), The Socio-Economic Context and Institutional Foundations of 











regulator had suffered a loss in credibility due to the handling of some disputes and its 
dealings in the allocation of a third GSM license. 
In August 2000, the ministry of public enterprises thus launched a policy framework 
to clarify the objectives in the restructuring process9, called "An Accelerated Agenda 
Towards the Restructuring of State Owned Enterprises". The objectives stated in the 
document are summarised in the second chapter of the policy framework (p.19): 
• To facilitate growth 
• To achieve wider ownership in the South African economy coupled with 
redistribution 
• Mobilising private sector capital and expertise 
• Reduction of the PSBR 
• Creation of effective market structures in sectors dominated by SOEs 
• Attraction of foreign direct investment 
• Enhancing the efficiency of SOEs 
• To finance growth and the requirements for competition 
• Accessing globally competitive technology 
Ayogu and Hodge (2000) note the differences in objectives to GEAR: firstly, there is 
an increased emphasis on the empowerment of historically disadvantaged people. It 
has been noted by the policymakers that attempts to empower have been very limited 
in their success and that they often suffered from a lack of capital to finance their 
share in public enterprises. The emphasis of the empowerment drive has thus shifted 
towards affirmative procurement, employment and training. It is seen as a much more 
realistic and meaningful vehicle to achieve a broader participation of previously 
disadvantaged people in the economy. Consequently, any licenses that will be 
awarded for Third Generation mobile phone services will have an empowerment 
requirement, be it that they may be awarded through a beauty contest or an auction. 
9 Republic of South Africa (2000), An Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of State Owned 











Secondly, it is noted that there is a shift in the assessment of government interest in 
the restructuring process. Where previously there was an emphasis on revenue 
generation for fiscal purposes, the government now sees itself as a shareholder 
maximising its returns from their holdings of the companies. This means that a SOB 
may not be completely privatised if the present value of dividend streams exceeds the 
proceedings from privatisation. The implications of this change in emphasis are 
twofold. On the one hand, government will tend to privatise less aggressively, 
especially if valuations of state owned enterprises are low. Secondly, policy should 
tend to be biased towards less competition and more towards the protection of the 
interests of SOBs, thus protecting the shareholding interest of the government. A 
government, which had already maximised equity from the complete sale of a SOB, 
would, on the other hand, not be biased against competition in the market. In the 
licensing context, this translates into reduced competition in 30 markets. A 
government pursuing the interests of its stake holdings, in this case Telkom and thus 
Vodacom, aggressively, would tend to license fewer companies to ensure superior 
value of its state owned enterprise. 
Thirdly, despite the implications of the second change in emphasis, the accelerated 
agenda postulates that competition is to be introduced in areas that are currently 
dominated by SOBs or their descendants. This measure hopes to improve efficiency in 
these areas, with the positive effects on growth and employment in mind. Industries in 
which competition cannot be meaningfully introduced, such as the water supply, 
effective regulation is seen as the tool of choice. Hence competition considerations 
will also playa role in the design of a UMTS licensing framework for South Africa. 
Overall, the policy framework postulates a coherent set of aims and tools with which 
state asset restructuring aids general macroeconomic aims. It does appreciate the 
different interests involved when stating that "different stakeholders will seek to 
emphasise different objectives at the expense of others"lO and the shortcomings of 
previous attempts at redistribution through state asset restructuring, noting that "black 
economic empowerment has been built on pyramid-type ownership frameworks, ... , 
there have been severe disappointments and even some failures."(p. 63) 











The licensing process will thus have to follow the aims set out by the policy 
framework and choose the appropriate measures which will be influenced by the 
environment variables of the industry and economy. 
I will now highlight the most important aspects South African Telecommunications 
policy, as laid out in the White Paper on Telecommunications Policyll, in the context 
of GEAR and the Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of SOEs. These will 
have an impact on the South African UMTS licensing process from the policy making 
side. 
2.2 Telecommunications Policy 
2.2.1 The Universal Service Obligation 
Apartheid economic policy implied uneven service provision to different racial groups 
in society. The White Paper on Telecommunications notes that "[n]owhere else does 
such disparity of access exist side by side with a developed communications 
technology sector. Nowhere else are both access and ownership so heavily 
concentrated in one population group. These imbalances, which are the legacy of 
apartheid, must be urgently redressed,,12. 
In the initial stages of telecommunications policy, before the White Paper of 1996, the 
GSM network rollout of MTN and Vodacom initially comprised the obligation to 
provide community service telephones13• It became clear, though, that this system was 
not optimal, since the cellular companies placed them where it was economically 
useful rather than socially desirable. Consequently, the so-called Universal Service 
Authority (USA) was set-up next to the regulator. This agency was to work together 
with the regulator, concentrating on keeping Universal Service "at the heart of 
telecommunications policy" (p.20) and to introduce telecommunications components 
into development projects. To finance these projects, cellular providers have to pay a 
share of their turnover into the Universal Service Authority's fund, which then 
redistributes the money into the projects. Hence although contracts were not a 
11 Republic of South Africa (1996), The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy 
12 Ibid. p.19 
13 Department of Posts and Telecommunications (1993), Issue of Licenses to Provide National Cellular 











complete failure in the insurance of Universal Service, the use of an authority which 
decides on the allocation of funds for universal service projects is now preferred. 
Since the formulation of the White Paper, there have been important changes in the 
South African telecommunications environment. Nowadays, there are more mobile 
telephone subscribers in South Africa, namely about 8 million, than there are fixed 
telephone lines14• The implications for basic Universal Service are quite striking: it is 
now possible to provide many poorer or remote regions with access to 
telecommunications, as the rollout of GSM networks progresses further, new or 
second hand terminals become more affordable and pre-paid telephony removes the 
need for a bank account. 
With the introduction of Third Generation licenses, the circumstances of the Universal 
Service regulation are going to change. Now the same number of social projects can 
be distributed onto a larger number of players in the market. Their contributions will 
therefore need to be smaner than under the present circumstances. 
Despite the distribution of universal service contributions onto more players, there 
will be changes in the outcome: increased costs for network providers may well create 
a higher market price under the oligopolistic competition the UMTS market will 
present. Higher prices would also mean that fewer subscribers would be willing to 
migrate from the close substitute of GSM networks. A smaller number of subscribers 
would also imply that fewer downstream services, such as specialised content 
provision, become profitable and hence there would be reduced opportunities in this 
new sector of the economy, potentially making Third Generation Services less of a 
success. 
The question whether or not to introduce Universal Service contributions into Third 
Generation license conditions revolves around a trade-off between growth and 
distribution. It need not be treated as an either or case, since it would be possible to 
postulate a gradual introduction of universal service fees, based on the notion that the 
GSM providers and fixed line companies have a considerable advantage over UMTS 
entrants in that they no longer have the large upfront investments to finance, but only 











have to maintain and develop their networks further. It might thus be viable to grant 
UMTS providers a preferred treatment, such as to boost their development initially. 
In the licensing process, authorities will have to weigh-up the importance of the 
different factors and base their decision on their objectives and economic rationale. 
2.2.2 Economic Empowerment 
As mentioned above, economic empowerment projects through state asset 
restructuring have been a limited success. The pyramid type ownership structures 
initially envisaged were hampered by a lack of capital and the cost of acquiring itlS , 
Most notably the privatisation of Sun Air had an empowerment component included 
which failed later on in the process. Empowerment share options in Telkom and the 
Airports Company also suffered from similar difficulties. The Accelerated Agenda 
hence explores new possibilities for the empowerment of disadvantaged groups in 
society. 
The first vehicle explored is that of widening ownership through investment vehicles 
such as the National Empowerment Fund (Republic of South Africa 2000) p.68 , 
which has stake holdings in SOEs and offers those at discounted prices to 
underprivileged groups in society. Should the policy makers choose to use this 
vehicle, then it might be the case that some part of license winners' companies will 
have to be set aside for investment in such schemes. Secondly, the Accelerated 
Agenda proposes the use of operational empowerment, which means the preferred 
treatment of disadvantaged groups in training, management, outsourcing and 
procurement (p.73). Lastly, there is a proposal for the use of employee share 
ownership programs, as pioneered by some US companies such as United Airlines, 
Starbucks and Wal-Mart. All these programs are to be used to improve the results 
from empowerment programs. The implications for the licensing process are the 
following. 
As the current policy stands, an economic empowerment proposal will have to be an 
integral part in any license application, independent of the mode of administration. 
What effects this will have on the efficiency and effectiveness of network operators is 
15 Republic of South Africa (2000), An Accelerated Agenda Towards the Restructuring of State Owned 











difficult to detennine. On the one hand, empowennent programs, with their focus on 
previously disadvantaged groups will tend to reduce income and human resource 
inequalities in the workforce, hence increasing overall human capital in the economy. 
On the other hand, the employees on an empowennent program will have to undergo 
a process of learning, which makes them likely to be less effective initially. 
One would thus expect efficiency in the network operators and their sourcing partners 
to be lower, having adverse growth impacts. These effects will be countered by an 
overall improvement in the economy, which would mitigate or reverse the negative 
effects described above. 
With a lot of the telecommunications sourcing being high-tech, and thus a very small 
sector of the economy, the question remains whether all license applicants will be able 
to secure the cooperation of an empowennent partner or whether they would be 
hampered by scarcity, should operational empowennent become an important aspect 
of license allocation. Should there be sufficient empowennent partners available, 
though, there may be above market prices for empowennent partnerships, which aids 
the notion of redistribution envisaged by the government. 
The above impacts suggest that the inclusion of empowennent criteria in the license 
conditions will reduce competition for the licenses. When designing the licensing 
process, authorities will therefore have to balance the different conflicting objectives. 
2.2.3 Competition 
As mentioned by Ayogu and Hodge, competition in newly privatised sectors is an 
important objective of the licensing process. The rationale for this are the beneficial 
effects that can be gained from increased competition: lower prices for consumers, 
increased product innovation and consequently faster growth of the sector, due to 
increased affordability and availability of different product variations. The precise 
framework showing the effects of competition on price will be laid out in a later 
section. 
During the licensing process, competition considerations will be one of the aspects 
taken into consideration. The government's set of objectives, however, includes 
further issues, such as empowerment, universal service, risk of failure, product 











authority will choose the most competitive solution, should other models serve their 
objectives more closely. 
I will now review 1icensing policy in the mobile telecommunications to date in South 
Africa. 
2.3 South African Cellular Licensing to Date 
So far, there have been two major rounds in the assignment of GSM licenses in South 
Africa. In 1993, Vodacom and MTN secured a GSM license. In 1997, SATRA, the 
South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, initiated a beauty contest 
for a third GSM license. This has not been awarded to date due to litigation by 
competitors against the recommendation made by SATRA to the minister of 
communications. 
I will now give a brief outline of the characteristics of beauty contests, the allocation 
mechanism used to date. 
2.3.1 Comparative Hearings (Beauty Contests) 
Beauty contests, the popular name for comparative hearings, are the oldest and most 
estabHshed way of assigning a license. Here, the government invites applications by 
companies for the licenses and then allocates them according to pre-defined criteria. 
In the case of South Africa's third GSM license, the evaluation criteria were: 
empowerment proposals, technical aspects, business plan and implementation 
strategy, universal service and the impact on the industry and consumers. 
The above criteria show one of the main advantages of using a beauty contest: it is 
possible to include numerous objectives in the license allocation process and the 
proposal nature makes it possible to develop an impression of how different license 
criteria will be handled in the future. Especially parts like empowerment cannot be 
easily forced on licensees through legislation, but rather need to be developed by the 
companies themselves to achieve the most efficient outcomes from their 
empowerment programs. Furthermore, an advantage of beauty contests is that license 
winners do not have to put up a large up-front investment as they have to do in the 
case of an auction. In a situation where the license winners may be capital 












On the other hand, comparative hearings are not so good at identifying the most 
efficient user of spectrum. Firstly, proposals can almost never be complete contracts, 
which makes it a possibility that applicants exaggerate their proposals so as to secure 
the license. Once the license has been allocated, the license winners are in a good 
position to renegotiate, since reallocating the license is costly both economically and 
politically. 
Secondly, license applications and evaluations can never be completely objective. 
Even when decision makers are completely impartial and keen to achieve the most 
efficient outcome, they may not be as well equipped to judge the situation as the 
competitors themselves, as they have a different information set regarding the 
possibilities and costs entailed in the proposals. 
A beauty contest gives the policy maker a large degree of control over the license 
conditions and the eventual outcome of the process. It will, however, not necessarily 
be the case that a beauty contest will identify the most efficient users of radio 
spectrum, since the process may not have the right incentive signals for the 
identification of the best user. 
2.3.2 The First Round of Cellular Licensing: MTN and Vodacom 
In 1994, the first two GSM providers received their licenses for South Africa16• These 
two licenses were awarded through a beauty contest with substantial license fees and 
additional license conditions. A third license was to be introduced later and has been 
tendered for, but has not yet been awarded due to reasons mentioned above. The 
phasing-in of network operators was to allow the profitable building of a market 
before the introduction of more pronounced competition, seeing that at the time of 
introduction, there was considerable uncertainty about the potential of GSM networks. 
Furthermore, the duopoly situation made the financing of license fees and additional 
license conditions possible, since lower competition meant a higher mark-up on cost. 
Government charged a substantial license fee of R 100 million to each of the license 
winners and a further fee of 5% of net operational income per annum. Additionally, 












Vodacom and MTN entered into obligations to participate In the joint economic 
development plan (JEDP) and to contribute to the Universal Service Authority's fund. 
The JEDp17 details the obligations by MTN and Vodacom towards the economic 
development of the telecommunications sector in South Africa. The license holders 
committed themselves to spending R 2,5 billion over a ten-year period. The objectives 
of the JEDP, as formulated by SATRA, are threefold: 
• To benefit the entire South African through developing the country's 
manufacturing capability in the areas of telecommunications and electronics 
• To enhance distribution and related services in the telecommunications sector 
• To facilitate the development of opportunities for the hitherto disadvantaged 
sectors of South African society l8 
SATRA continues to point out the beneficial impact it hopes this will have on the 
international competitiveness of South African manufacturing. Seen as particularly 
important are empowerment components entailed in the employment of people from 
disadvantaged communities. Lastly, SATRA also details the tools with which it 
expects the JEDP objectives to be achieved: research and development in 
telecommunications, exports of locally produced hardware and equipment, the use of. 
the local workforce in the production of these products, the training of South African 
citizens, participation in international projects and finally foreign direct investment. 
In addition to the license fees and the contributions to the JEDP, the GSM operators 
have to pay a share of their turnover towards the Universal Service Authority's fund 
as specified in the White Paper on Telecommunications Policy19. 
Overall, MTN and Vodacom had to pay license fees, enter into the JEDP and 
contribute to the Universal Service Fund, for which they were awarded a duopoly for 
a limited period of time. Later decisions by the regulator have, however, shown that 
there is a certain preference towards new entrants. 
17 http://satra.gov.zaJabout.htm 
18 ibid. 











In 2000, the incumbents applied for additional spectrum in the GSM 1800 band to 
extend their bandwidth. ICASA refused their applications20 on the grounds of 
potentially inhibiting the development of future license holders who might need the 
spectrum for their licenses. 
More recently, the reputation of SATRA has been dented in the licensing of the Third 
Cellular Network. 
2.3.3 The Licensing Process of the Third GSM Operator 
In June 1999, nine applications for a third GSM license were received by SATRA, 
following its license tender through the use of a beauty contest. The license winner 
was to be determined by judging five different criteria, namely empowerment, 
technical feasibility and planning, the business model and rollout strategy, universal 
service and the envisaged impact on the telecommunications industry and consumers. 
Out of the nine applications, one was disqualified and one withdrew, leaving seven 
potential license winners21. Once again, substantial weight was laid on universal 
service and empowerment issues, as was done in the case of MTN and Vodacom. 
By June 2000, SATRA had concluded its deliberations and elected to recommend 
Cell C as the license recipient to the minister of communications. Even before the 
minister could make the announcement of the winner, in which she would presumably 
have followed the recommendation by the regulation authority, Nextcom gained a 
judicial interdiction22 that prevented the announcement of the winner. These events 
had followed the protests of Nextcom as they viewed the decision process to have 
been flawed and the actions of SATRA (which has in the meantime been replaced by 
ICASA, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa) to have been in 
bad faith23 . 
In the allocation, SATRA chose Cell Cover Nextcom, although Nextcom and Five 
Mobile Networks were the only applicants to comply with all license criteria. It was 
20 SATRA (2000), ICASA Responds to 1800MHz Frequency Spectrum Application by MTN and 
Vodacom 
21 SATRA (2000), 3rd Cellular License 
22 Business Day (2000), Cell licence in limbo again 











on this basis that Nextcom claimed that Cell C had been chosen independently of the 
quality of its proposal and that every effort had been made to ensure that the licensing 
was won by Cell C. 
The lengthy court battle that has ensued means that there are considerable economic 
consequences as well as a loss of credibility of the regulator. SATRA and its 
descendant ICASA are now seen as unreliable and incompetent, due to the inability to 
conclude the beauty contest without one of the applicants taking legal action against 
its ruling. In future beauty contests, ICASA could have difficulty defending its 
decisions due to its bad track record in this field. 
The macroeconomic- and telecommunications policy formulated by the government 
are unique. Not only does the government have precise aims it wishes to achieve with 
this policy framework, but experience from the Third Cellular license and the 
importance of UMTS for further economic development mean that the success of this 
program is very important. It will be important to choose the correct tools to achieve 
the ends, which will be manifested in the design of the license. The most important 
part about the license design will be the way in which they are awarded. 
There are two further allocation mechanisms known to policy makers, namely 
lotteries and auctions. Lotteries were used for a brief period in the United States to 
reduce the backlog on license allocation, aiming to let the market reallocate the 
licenses to the most efficient users, but were then quickly discarded when it became 
apparent that there were large windfall gains given away by the government and that 
the roll out of some services was slowed by the reallocation necessary. McMillan 
points out that 400,000 applications were received for cellular licenses in the United 
States during the 1980s24 and leading to huge windfalls for companies and individuals 
that never intended to run a cellular network. He quotes an example where 
Southwestern Bell paid $ 41 million for a cellular license to serve the Cape Cod area 
to RACDG Partnership. 
Given the brevity of use, lotteries never really established themselves and thus do not 
present a serious alternative to the use of a beauty contest. Auctions, on the other 











hand, have seen increasing use in license allocation over the past decade. It is thus 











3 The Use of Auctions in Airwave Licensing 
As mentioned in section 3.3, beauty contests used to be the prevailing mechanism for 
the assignment of radio spectrum. In early 1990s, however, the New Zealand 
government decided to auction off radio, television and cellular phone licenses rather 
than administrating them through the classical comparative hearing system25• Since 
then, there have been numerous auctions used to allocate radio spectrum to 
companies, most prominently in the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) 
auctions of the United States in 1994-96 and the licensing rounds for Third 
Generation (3G) licenses in Europe and the rest of the world. 
3. 1 Types of Auctions Used 
The history of auctions is long and so is the list of different auction types in existence. 
License auctions tend to be multi object auctions, meaning that more than one license 
is usually up for tender, making it fundamentally different from classical franchise 
bidding. Here, bidders are competing for the right to serve part of the market which 
has to be established, unlike in monopoly franchise bidding, which allows the winner 
to keep an established market as a monopolist. 
There are two basic ways in which several licenses can be allocated: the auction can 
either be sequential, meaning each license will be auctioned after another. The 
alternative to this is a simultaneous auction, in which the auctioneer accepts bids for 
several objects at the same time. In the following sections, I will review the features 
and merits of each of the auction styles in turn. 
3.1.1 Sequential Auctions 
Sequential auctions are often the method of choice when many objects, such as plots 
of land or works of art are auctioned. Here, each single object is auctioned after the 
other, closing the bidding on a single object before starting on the next one. 
The main attraction of this auction system is its administrative simplicity. It is much 
easier to auction single objects than multiple objects for two reasons: on the one hand, 











a single object auction will not be difficult to bring to an end. When the bidding 
ceases on the object at stake, the auctioneer will call the close of the auction. In multi 
object sequential auctions, however, there is considerable uncertainty about when the 
auction should close. This, however, will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section. 
The second advantage of a sequential auction, as McMillan26 describes, is that the 
bidders do know which license has already gone to which bidder, and which licenses 
are still available. This advantage is mitigated by an important property of radio 
spectrum licenses, though: they are both substitutes and complements at the same 
time. When bidding for a combination of licenses, adding another license adds to the 
value of the license holdings, but should the license be unavailable, another one will 
be a possible substitute for it. The fact that licenses are dependent among each other 
means that the valuation that bidders attach to them change during the course of the 
auction: should a bidder fail to secure a second license, the price paid for the first one 
may no longer be appropriate. 
A further area of inefficiency noted by McMillan is the fact that predatory pricing 
may occur under sequential auctions: a strategic bidder may drive up prices for early 
licenses such that bidders may not be able to compete for the later objects in the 
auction. 
One prerequisite for efficiency is that identical objects, in this case licenses of equal 
value, sell for the same price. McAfee and McMillan27 describe that this is not always 
the case in sequential auctions: when Cable TV licenses were auctioned in Israel in 
1987-1990, the price of licenses acquired later was higher than the price of those 
bought earlier on in the process. This was attributed to inter-license 
complementarities, meaning that the same license auctioned later was worth more to 
those who already held a license than to those who didn't yet hold a license. 
Consequently, the condition for efficiency was violated under the use of a sequential 
auction. 
26 Ibid. p.lS3 











3.1.2 Simultaneous Auctions 
As described in the earlier section, simultaneous auctions allocate multiple objects at 
the same time rather then sequentially. There are two major types of auctions that we 
have to distinguish: single round auctions and multi round auctions. As the names 
suggest, in a single round auction, there is one round of bidding which will decide the 
winner of the auction. Under multi round auctions, the bidding continues for several 
rounds until the auction is closed under some rule imposed by the auctioneer. 
By the nature of single round auctions, they are necessarily closed, or sealed bid 
auctions, implying that the bidders do not know what the others have bid for the 
objects. Under multi round auctions, there are once again two subtypes, one where 
bidding information is revealed at the close of each round, hence being "open", and 
one where bidding information remains private and the bidder only knows whether he 
is the winning bidder or not. 
I will now discuss the different types of auctions in tum. 
3.1.2.1 Single Round Simultaneous Auctions 
The use of single round sealed bid Vickery auctions was pioneered by New Zealand 
in its sale of radio spectrum in 1990. The regulator chose to auction under a so-called 
second price auction, where the highest bidder receives the license, but at the price of 
the bid the second highest bidder put in. This deliberate reduction in the sums paid 
was chosen to combat the biggest weakness of sealed single round auctions, namely 
that of the "winner's curse". The winner's curse means that due to the fact that 
bidders know not what others have bid for the license and consequently how they 
value the license, they will have to bid the maximum that they expect the license to be 
worth. The winner of the license will thus be the bidder that overestimated the value 
of the license by the greatest amount, leaving him "cursed" with an overpriced 
license. Hence when a bidder puts in a high bid for the license, awarding the license to 
him at the price of the second highest bid reduces the potentially detrimental 
overpayment. 
The New Zealand auction showed that this second price mechanism, whilst 











when the number of bidders is small: McMillan28 cites a case where the highest bid 
was NZ $100,000, but the licensee ended up paying only NZ $6, the second highest 
bid. This kind of embarrassment may have been avoided through more careful design 
of the auction, namely through the imposition of minimum reserve prices. The details 
of auction design will be discussed in a later section, though. 
It is important to note that the single round mechanism is prone to license 
overvaluation by the license applicants, since they do not have the opportunity to 
increase their information set about the value of the license during the course of the 
auction. When considering the 30 case, it becomes evident that this would pose a 
particularly heavy toll on the quality of the auction. The new technology allows for a 
completely new set of products and services, the revenues of which are still extremely 
uncertain. This would imply that the potential for over-valuation would be much 
higher in the case of the 30 auction than in an established market with more certain 
revenues. Secondly, the number of bidders for national mobile telephone licenses will 
most likely be relatively smalL This means that the difference between the first and 
second highest bids may be considerable. The functioning of the second price 
mechanism would not be guaranteed, as it only tries to approximate the result from 
perfect information about the license anyway. 
3.1.2.2 Multi Round Simultaneous Auctions 
In more recent auctions for radio spectrum in the United States and Europe, 
simultaneous ascending auctions have been the method of choice: here, mUltiple 
objects were auctioned simultaneously and over several rounds. 
To illustrate more precisely, lets take the British example: there, 5 UMTS license 
were auctioned simultaneously in early 2000. The auction lasted more than 100 
rounds of bidding, and at the end of each the bids from each contender were made 
public. This format was chosen to allow the bidders to collect as much information 
about the value of licenses as possible, through the observation of the rivals' bidding 
behaviour. We therefore speak of an "open" multi-round simultaneous auction. 
Although the theory is quite clear about the superiority of simultaneous auctions in 
general, they have been criticised for the difficulty in working them. Whilst it is quite 











clear when a sequential auction closes, this is not necessarily the case for a 
simultaneous auction. There two basic possibilities brought forward. The auction 
could either close for each license individually when the bidding on the license ceases 
or the auction could close for all licenses when bidding ceases on all licenses. Upon 
inspection, the former mechanism reveals itself to be a sequential auction in disguise. 
The natural choice would therefore be to close the auction when bidding ceases on all 
objects. This system can quickly run into difficulties, though: when there are many 
objects up for auction, the length of the auction can be extended into infinity by 
delaying the pace of the auctions. Milgrom29 identifies a major motive for the delay of 
a multi object auction in budget constraints. When competitors are budget constrained 
and the information about this constraint is private they will benefit from holding 
back and therefore not revealing their potential to pay until competitors have 
committed most of their budget to some of the licenses. It is therefore necessary to 
introduce a mechanism that will lead to a timely conclusion of the auction. 
The developers of the simultaneous ascending auction hence introduced the notion of 
activity rules. There are different types of these used. At the FCC auction, bidders had 
to bid on a minimum proportion of the licenses they wanted to be eligible for. This 
means that in the first stage, they had to bid on at least one third of the licenses they 
wanted to be eligible for, in the second stage on two thirds of the licenses, and in the 
final stage of the auction, they had to bid on the whole number of the licenses they 
wanted to be eligible for. The auctioneer was to decide on the start of a new stage, 
doing so when the auction began to slow down and bidding became passive. Bidding 
on a license in this context meant that the contenders had to put a higher bid at a 
minimum bid increment defined by the auctioneer, unless he was already the highest 
bidder on the object he was bidding on. 
A second type of activity rule was used in the German UMTS auction: there, license 
applicants bid on abstract "license blocks", being allowed to bid on three of these 2 x 
5 MHz blocks to pursue a "large" license, but needing to acquire at least two blocks 
for a valid license. The activity rule in this case was such that bidders could only bid 
on a non-increasing number of blocks: if they had started out bidding for three blocks 
and reduced their bid to two blocks later on, they could not return to bidding for three 











blocks anymore. This condition, in addition to a minimum bid increment meant that 
the bidding process had a finite time horizon. 
The fact that incumbents generally benefit from the delay of the auction, both through 
the delayed introduction of services and the revelation of information by competitors 
means that activity rules are crucial to the success of multi object auctions. 
The great advantage of simultaneous auctions, the fact that bidders are able to extend 
their understanding of the value of the license during the auction, can at the same time 
be its greatest disadvantage: if bidders are able to learn who is bidding what during 
the auction, then it makes it much easier for them to enter into collusive arrangements. 
This fact lead to considerations during the FCC license auctions whether to keep 
bidding standings private or whether to publicise the results at the end of each round. 
The solution found was to make the results anonymous, hence revealing how other 
firms were bidding, but not revealing the bidding strategies of single firms. 3o 
Turning back to the German U1VlTS auction, the regulators decided to make the 
results of each bidding round public, but placed stringent restrictions on the 
communications by bidders: every company was placed in a separate room with only 
one phone and one fax line they could use to transfer information to their 
headquarters. Furthermore, an official from the regulation authority was present in the 
room of the bidder at all times. Bids were submitted through a computer interface, 
attempting to minimize the amount of communication and hence the potential for 
collusion between bidders. 
Despite all these precautions, firms tried to communicate during the auction using the 
bids they submitted for license blocks: one bidder, D2, owned by 
VodafonelMannesmann, on some occasions submitted bids above the minimum 
increment to include the digit "6" in their bids, a fact that was seen by observers as an 
offer to accept a so-called "small" license of 2x 10 MHz instead of continuing to seek 
a "large" license of 2x15 MHz. The only other competitor still seeking a large license, 
T-Mobil, owned by Deutsche Telekom, "declined" the offer and proceeded to bid for 
a large license, thus making a timely conclusion of the auction impossible. The lack of 
cooperation raised another DM 30 billion for the government, since the attempts for 











co-operation were introduced when the total license fee stood at about DM 70 billion. 
The end result was that the two companies seeking large licenses did in the end have 
to settle for a small license, but at a much higher price then had been possible 
previously. Assuming that the license winners will be able provide the same level of 
service as in the case of less expensive licenses, and assuming that pricing follows the 
Cournot model of oligopolistic competition, this outcome is preferable to the 
government: service levels and prices will be the same, but the government will have 
maximised its revenue, thus reducing the level of supernormal profits derived from 
the license. 
When looking at the more recent auctions for radio spectrum, it becomes clear that 
simultaneous ascending auctions are the method of choice nowadays. Although there 
are dangers relating to the degree of communication between the bidding parties 
involved, and careful consideration has to be placed on activity rules to make the time 
horizon finite, the beneficial effects on the discovery of the true license value 
outweigh the impediments by the above. 
3.2 The Rationale for the Use of Auctions 
3.2.1 Efficiency 
The government, acting in the interest of the whole population, is seeking to 
maximise economic efficiency when auctioning-off licenses for Third Generation 
Mobile Phones. In this context, we can view efficiency from two perspectives: lehiel 
and Moldovanu31 identify the sum of producer and consumer surplus as the measure 
for efficiency in the market. They further note that since the consumers do not partake 
directly in spectrum auctions, it is difficult to achieve a measure of consumer surplus 
achieved through the use of an auction. The argument hence continues that under 
standard oligopoly situations, which mobile phone markets with a relatively small 
number of licenses reflect, efficiency and consumer surplus are increasing in the 
amount of competition and hence the amount of participants in the market can serve 
as a proxy for efficiency. This in tum implies that the number of participants in the 
31 lehiel and Moldovanu (2000), A Critique of the Planned Rules for The German VMTS/IMT-2000 











market ought to be maximised for as long as entry is technically and economically 
viable. 
A Coumot model of oligopolistic competition, as found in Church and Ware32, 
supports the prediction made by Jehiel and Moldovanu. There, assuming that firms 
are symmetric in their cost structure and have equal market shares, the former being a 
useful assumption for the analysis of license allocations, too. The Coumot model then 
predicts that the mark-up over marginal cost will be decreasing in the number of firms 
in the market: 
pC -Me 1 
pC EN 
(1) 
Here, pC is the price charged by the Coumot oligopolist, MC is the marginal cost of 
production, E is the industry elasticity of demand and N is the number of firms 
competing. Clearly, as N goes to infinity, the right hand side (RHS) of the equation 
tends to 0 and so does the difference between price and marginal cost. 
Mobile telephony is, however, characterised by large fixed costs. The first contracts 
for the development of 3G networks have been awarded in Germany, Ericsson and 
Siemens being awarded contracts of € 500 million each by D233, one of the license 
winners in Germany. This will not be the complete costs of building a network, 
though, since these contracts are well below the € 1,6 billion Mobilcom, one of the 
other winners of a German lJMTS license, paid for its contract with Ericsson34. 
Considering there are very substantial fixed costs involved in the building of 3G 
networks, there will be a limit on the number of competitors the market can absorb: 
should the price be pushed below long run average cost (LRAC), then entry would not 
be beneficial anymore. 
32 Church and Ware (2000), Industrial Organisation, A Strategic Approach p.241 












The number of licenses, and hence entry conditions are, however, not dependent on 
the use of auctions for the allocation of radio spectrum, but are a choice made by 
regulators irrespective of the allocation mechanism chosen.35 
The second dimension of efficiency which is relevant in assigning property rights to 
the radio spectrum: apart from introducing the "correct" number of license holders 
into the market to maximise surplus and hence efficiency, it is the aim of the 
allocation process to identify the most efficient users of radio spectrum. These are the 
firms that will be able to use the spectrum in the best manner. In a market context, this 
means that those firms that will be able to make the highest profits from the activity 
should hold the licenses. 
Assuming profitability approximates efficiency, firms are better able to identify 
opportunities from the use of a radio spectrum license than the regulators are, due to 
private information about cost structures and revenue potential of the companies. 
Consequently, regulators are fairly ill equipped to determine the best users of the 
radio spectrum. When companies are bidding for the spectrum comparatively, they 
will gear their bids to the value set of the regulator, not necessarily revealing the true 
potential of their operations, or on the other hand making exaggerated proposals 
which they might have to revoke after the license allocation. 
When bidding competitively for a license, bidders will have to put "their money 
where their mouth is". This means that companies must be willing to put real 
resources on the line now to obtain the licenses, rather than making promises about 
future actions. Should bidding conditions be competitive, companies ought to be 
willing to commit the net present value of above-normal profits they envisage as the 
license fee. Hence those bidders who are willing to pay the most for the license will 
arguably be the most efficient ones. 
Milgrom formalises this in his 2000 paper36. He likens the auction process to the 
classical "tatonnement" mechanism, in which an auctioneer tries to approximate 
efficiency by proposing prices and bidders making what Milgrom calls "tentative" 
35 It has to be added that only the auction mechanism allows for an endogenous number of licenses in 
the allocations process, whereas beauty contests and lotteries must have a fixed number of licenses ex 
ante. 











bids, i.e. bids without a commitment. Two main differences immediately anse 
between the tatonnement mechanism and ascending auctions: first, prices are strictly 
increasing in the auction environment, and secondly the bids submitted are real 
resource commitments rather than tentative bids. Milgrom then proceeds to prove the 
existence of a competitive equilibrium in three steps. 
First, he defines the indivisible licenses for sale as L=[I,oo .. L], a subset of which is 
denoted by S. A bidder i acquiring the set S then derives a utility of vi(S)-m, where m 
is the amount of money paid for the set of licenses. The vector of prices is defined to 
be p, and the total price paid for the set of licenses p * S. The resulting demand 
function is of for Dj(p) = argmaxS{vi(S) - p * S}. Milgrom further introduces notion 
of holding the current high bid during the auction. The bidder demands the set of 
licenses T at price vector p, i.e. T E X(p), if a demand of S E D(p) exists such that 
S:::JT. 
Given the activity rule present in simultaneous ascending auctions, the price for the 1-
th license will be PI + £, for some £>0. Theorem 1 states that if for bidder j, after round 
n, the personalised assignment is Sj E xlpi), where pi is the personalised price vector 
introduced through the minimum bid increase. If j bids straightforwardly then his 
assignment at the end of round n + 1 would be S'j E Xlpi\ pi' being the personalised 
price vector at the end of round n + 1. The theorem then states that the profits would 
always be non-negative, a requirement for efficiency. The proof of which is described 
in (Milgrom 2000) p.252 . 
The second theorem states that the final assignment will maximise the value of total 
license to within a single bid increment, the proof of which is also to be found on page 
252 of the above paper. 
The third theorem claims that a competitive equilibrium exists, and is proven using 
theorem two (Milgrom 2000) p.254 . 
Auction mechanisms will therefore reveal more accurately and reliably those 












3.2.2 Revenue Generation 
Some of the recent UMTS license auctions in Europe have been a big success from 
the point of view of revenue generation: the UK auction of 5 licenses raised £23 
billion (€38.5 billion), translating into €12637 for a license per head of population. In 
Germany, the regulator received DM98.8 billion for six 2xlO MHz licenses, equalling 
a price of €102 per license and head of population. Considering the sheer size of 
money combined with the fact that "[l]ike diamonds, budget pressures are forever,,38, 
revenue generation has gained in importance. 
This risen importance is reflected by the experiences of two other European countries, 
namely Spain and France: the Spanish government had decided to license 3G 
frequencies through a beauty contest which had been completed early in 2000. The 
revenue generated in the UK and Germany, however, lead to the government 
considering the introduction of a yearly fee of €150 million for each license in 
addition to the €130 million license fee raised during the beauty contest. This would 
translate to license fee of €52 per head of population and license over the duration of 
the licenses39. 
France, on the other hand, decided to put a high reserve price on its licenses despite 
using a beauty contest: there, every license will cost FF 32.5 billion, equalling €56 per 
head of population and license (again, normalised to a 2xlO MHz license). This is, by 
economic theory, arguably the worst solution to the licensing problem, since it 
combines the financial risk of an auction with the disadvantages in selection of a 
beauty contest. In addition to this, the license applicants will not have the same level 
of information about their competitors' valuation of the licenses since they do not 
reveal themselves in multiple rounds of bidding as they would in a simultaneous 
ascending auction. The French government thus may impose a "winners curse", by 
which the winners of the licenses may be the eventual losers since they overestimated 
the value of the license, by inhibiting them from using informational advantages of an 
37 For a 2 x 10 MHz license. This normalisation was chosen due to different license sizes. 
38 Noam (1998), Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's 
Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access p.774 











auction, which can, as will be shown in later sections, reduce the risk of the winner's 
curse. 
Whilst pointing out the enormous revenue potential of Third Generation mobile phone 
license auctions, an early caveat is necessary: a lot of other auctions in Europe were 
seen as a failure in part due to the lack of attracting entry and especially when they 
failed to raise the expected amounts of revenue for the government. In Austria, license 
winners had to pay €14 per license and head of population, in the Netherlands €37 and 
in Italy €42. These shortcomings in revenue generation can be attributed to design 
flaws in the different countries which will be discussed in a later section. 
It is important to note, though, that the use of an auction by no means guarantees that 
the auctioneer will be able to raise large revenues. 
3.2.3 Transparency 
As the quote from Noam's paper makes clear, beauty contests are prone to be a highly 
politicised process and thus open to the influence of pressure groups. Although it 
might seem easy to make a comparative hearing transparent through the use of well-
defined criteria, there is still scope for the discretion by the policy maker. Especially 
in countries which have a bad track record on corruption, or those where the regulator 
does not have a great deal of credibility, the efficiency of allocation by beauty 
contests is questionable, as the South African case has shown. It is in those countries 
especially where the transparency advantages of an auction will be beneficial: tying 
the hands of the regulator by making the allocation mechanistic will aid efficient and 
impartial allocation of licenses. Discretion of the policy maker is thus restricted to the 
first stage of the allocation process, the design of the licenses and the auction, rather 
than also controlling the eventual allocation of the licenses themselves. 
Even if a beauty contest is made more mechanistic, it will still fall short of the 
transparency of an auction mechanism. Mathematical economists have created very 
strong cases for certain models of license auctioning, which, if followed, should lead 
to efficient license allocations. In beauty contests, on the other hand, the setting of 
criteria by the governing body will always be unclear to some degree, since it will 
always involve discretion to what should be achieved in license allocation. In 











3.3 Dangers in Auctioning Licenses 
3.3.1 Design Intricacies 
3.3.1.1 Reserve Prices 
McMillan40 provides an intuitive and compelling reasoning for the introduction of 
reserve prices when auctioning radio spectrum: citing the New Zealand auction of 
radio spectrum discussed previously, he remarked that one license was given away for 
free to a student bidding NZ $1 for a city's television license due to the lack of 
bidding competition. Furthermore, in another license bid, the high bid was NZ $7 
million and the second highest bid NZ $50.000. These perversions of the auctioning 
process were caused by the lack of sufficient bidding competition. The public 
perception was, however, that it was wrong to give the licenses away for next to 
nothing when bidders obviously valued them much higher. 
The institution of reserve prices therefore plays a double role. On the one hand, they 
ensure that licenses aren't given away for trivial amounts of money. This is important 
from a political perspective, since the proceedings are often seen as a proxy for the 
success of an auction in the eyes of the public. Secondly, reserve prices will ensure 
that trivial bids are not possible. The example with the university student winning the 
television license underlines that in some cases, it might be better not to license rather 
than licensing too cheaply. This claim is founded on the notion that under competitive 
bidding, licensees will be willing to commit some of the future profits to license fees. 
A bid of NZ $1 means that the bidder does not expect to make any profits. Should the 
market become interesting in the future, then the license holder will most likely be 
able to extract some rents from a company wishing to run the service. Experiences 
from reallocations of licenses from the US lottery award system showed that the 
reallocation of licenses from inefficient users to those being able to use the license 
efficiently slowed down the rollout of cellular services in the United States. The 
double function of ensuring the sincerity of bids and substituting for competition in 
case of lack thereof is served by reserve prices, a fact that makes them a crucial 











ingredient in a successful license auction in contexts where competition could be 
small. 
Clearly, in the case of UMTS licensing, competition would be high enough to ensure 
that licenses would not be won with trivial bids. However, in cases where competition 
for a license could be small, a solution to the problem could be to set the reserve price 
at an extremely conservative estimate of discounted profits. Creating a process to 
determine the level of reserve prices could, on the other hand, pose a considerable 
challenge. 
3.3.1.2 Default Penalties and Deposits 
When referring to the dangers of missing a default penalty in the design of the 
auction, McMillan41 cites the Australian satellite TV license auction. When two 
licenses were auctioned in 1993, "dark horses" won, outbidding consortia including 
Rupert Murdoch and Telecom Australia. It then emerged that one of the winning 
bidders, Hi Vision, only had an issued capital of A $100 and had bid A $177 million 
for the license, Dcom, the other wining bidder, A $212 million. It quickly emerged 
that both winners of the bid could not pay for the licenses and proceeded to default on 
their bid. This action was planned, however, since the design of the auction failed to 
include any penalty for defaulting on the bid. The winners of the bid had put in 
multiple bids at A $5 million intervals and continued to default on their bids until they 
finally paid A $117 million for the license and sold it to Australis Media for a A $21 
million profit. 
The consequences of a lack of default penalties become clear through the Australian 
example: when the bids submitted aren't binding, they lose their characteristics of 
reflecting the ability of the bidder to use the spectrum profitably. Consequently, bids 
will become trivial and the whole auction outcome perverted. 
The FCC auctions hence introduced default penalties: if a bidder withdrew his bid 
during the auction, he had to pay the difference between his bid and what the license 











eventually was sold for. Withdrawing the bid after the close of the auction meant a 
further 3% fine42• 
A further measure to ensure the sincerity of bidders is taken in most auctions: bidders 
have to deposit substantial sums of money to ensure that they are actually capable of 
paying for the licenses afterwards and that they are not just bidding trivially. 
Intuitively, it will prevent occurrences such as the trivial bidding in Australia by 
imposing the hurdle of having to raise a certain minimum amount of money before the 
start of the auction. 
3.3.1.3 Choosing the "correct" number of licenses 
Once it has been ensured that the technical details of the auction do not allow the 
auction outcome to be trivialised or perverted, the most important question is the 
number of licenses that ought to be up for tender. On this question, there has been 
some considerable debate and different countries have chosen to pursue different 
avenues. 
The three factors influencing the number of licenses that should be auctioned are quite 
intuitive: the size of the market, in terms of population or potential users, may put 
limitations on the maximum amount of players that may be supported by the market. 
Secondly, the available spectrum is a limiting factor: the UMTS Forum43 estimates 
the requirement per operator at 2x15 MHz of paired capacity (up and downstream) 
and 5 MHz of unpaired capacity (downstream only). With downstream capacity, users 
are able to receive data from the network. Upstream capacity is required when UMTS 
users want to send data to the network. In a telephone conversation or a 
videoconference, both up- and downstream capacity is needed. For the download of 
large internet files, such as music, on the other hand, only downstream capacity is 
required. Paired capacity is thus far more valuable than unpaired capacity. 
In the German case, each of the six license winners finally received an allocation of 
2xlO MHz and five out of the six license winners received an additional lx5 MHz of 
unpaired capacity44 due to the limited spectrum available. Thirdly, the number of 
42 Ibid. p.155 
43 UMTS Forum (1999), UMTS Forum Reports 1-6: Executive Summary p.IS 











incumbents45 plays a vital role in the allocation of new licenses. Intuitively, one 
would expect the incumbents to hold a higher valuation of the licenses available then 
a potential entrant, assuming that incumbents and new entrants are equally efficient 
managerially and have the same access to finance. On the one hand, incumbents have 
an existing customer base and brand name that should make the acquisition of 
customers for their new service more efficient and hence more profitable, at least in 
the short to medium term. Furthermore, incumbents have already invested in 
infrastructure, which they will be able to reuse at least in part. 
These economies of scope make it very unlikely that a new entrant will be able to 
secure a license in the case where the number of licenses is equal to or smaller than 
the number of existing 20 operators. This may be undesirable, since rational entrants 
will realise this problem and will not compete for a license in this case. An auction 
could then become trivial, as in the case of the Dutch 30 auction46• More detail of this 
auction will be outlined below. 
As a consequence, in the British auction, the authorities decided auction five licenses, 
reserving the largest one specifically for a new entrant. The outcome of this auction 
was such that the incumbents secured all four of the remaining licenses. 
In the case where the number of licenses is fixed, it is possible to decide ex ante what 
the "correct" number of licenses will be and hence to predetermine whether there will 
be entry or whether the incumbents will most likely win the licenses. 
The effects of such a "mishap" were to be seen in the case of the Dutch UMTS license 
auction. There, five licenses were for sale matching the number of five incumbents 
perfectly. The potential new entrants realised that they would not prevail in the 
auction, hence they all pulled out before the start of the auction or decided to partner 
with other companies47 . This left only one potential new entrant, Versatel, 
participating in the bidding, but this bidder pulled out on the first day of bidding after 
meeting with one of the competing companies. This lead to allegations of collusion 
from the government, followed by the searching of offices of the meeting parties and 
legal action. 
45 "incumbents" in this context means firms already operating in 2G, i.e. GSM, markets 
46 Financial Times (2000), 3G Country Information 











In the case of where the market does not allow any further licenses to be issued and 
hence makes it impossible to entice competition by keeping a license for new entrants, 
Klemperer in the above article suggests an "Anglo-Dutch" auction as an example. In 
this model, there would be a number of rounds of open bidding followed by one 
single and final sealed bid round. The suggested advantage of this mechanism is that 
new entrants are offered a real chance to outbid incumbents in a single round without 
the possibility of the incumbent reversing the outcome. As discussed in previous 
sections, the sealed bid nature of the auction means that there will be considerable 
uncertainty about the outcome and this might the recreate the problem which was to 
be originally avoided, namely the winner's curse. 
A second model of allocating licenses was chosen in Germany and Austria. There, the 
number of licenses was endogenous and dependent on the bidding patterns. Instead of 
bidding for licenses, participants of the auction bid for abstract license blocks of 2x5 
MHz paired capacity. The minimum they had to acquire for a license were two 
blocks, leading to a "small" license, the maximum allowed was for three blocks, a so-
called "large" license. Therefore, depending on how many bidders acquired how 
many blocks, the outcome of the auction could be anything between four and six 
licenses. In the second round of bidding, unpaired frequency would be allocated 
among the winners of licenses. 
Before the start of the auction in Germany, lehiel and Moldovanu48 pointed out that 
this auctioning mechanism would favour an outcome with four licenses, due to the 
fact that incumbents had a head start in the market as described above and due to the 
fact that they had an incentive to protect their profits from 2G networks since any 
entrant winning a 3G license would be allowed to offer 2G services, too. 
It will be useful to review the workings of the Iehiel and Moldovanu model: 
Assume there are 4 incumbent firms (as in the German market) and m ~ 2 "new 
entrants". It is further assumed that all firms are symmetric in their cost, knowledge 
and financial possibilities. 












The profits derived from a license are dependent on the number of firms licensed, n, 
and the number of blocks the bidder has acquired, k. Hence the resulting profit is 
7Cinj'?O. These represent the expected profits from the future 30 market and are 
increasing in k and decreasing in n. 
A further variable is the cost to the entrant of building a network, called c. Since any 
entrant will be allowed to build a 20 network, too, Jehiel and Moldovanu denote the 
profits that incumbents expect to lose as a result of this as J{n)?O. Lastly, the loss of 
an incumbent in the 20 market if he doesn't acquire a 30 license is denoted as 
l1(n)?'J{n). 
From this framework, we can derive pay-offs for different outcomes: 
Outcome 
Incumbent wins a license: 
Entrant wins a license: 
Incumbent doesn't win a license: 






Hence, they proceed to show that if one entrant gets licensed, then all of the 
incumbents will be, too: the non-negativity constraint on entrants means that 1tk(n)-
kb-c?O¢::?1tk(n)-kb?c>O. If we assume on the contrary that an incumbent does not get 
a license, bidding less then b on the blocks, then his payoff becomes -11(n):50. Further 
assume a deviation that he bids b+c: on the blocks, hence his payoff becomes: 1tk(n)-
k(b+c)-y(n)?c-kc:-y(n»-y(n)?-11 (n). This deviation is profitable, contradicting the 
eqUilibrium described above. Hence if an entrant wins a license, the incumbents are 
certain to win a license, too. 
The most important result from this paper, though, is shows that it is very unlikely for 
six firms to get licensed. The proof is as follows: from the above claim, any 
equilibrium with six licensed firms will include all four incumbents. Entrants will 











we get The incumbent will have a payoff of n2(6)-2b-y(6). If an 
incumbent then deviates on one block by bidding b+E on it, then there will be only 5 
licenses holders. The resulting payoff for the incumbent will be n3(5)-3b-E-y(5). 
Hence for six licenses to prevail, we need n3(5)-3b-E-y(5)~ n2(6)-2b-y(6). This 
b~7r2(6)-c 
translates into n3(5)+y(6)- y(5)~ n2(6)+b. Due to 2 , we get 
7r
3
(5)+y(6) y(5)+~~ 37r2 (6) 
2 2 for the eqUilibrium with six licenses to exist. For an 
equilibrium with five licenses to prevail, Jehiel and Moldovanu show that 
7r3(4)+r(5)-r(4)+~~ 37r2 (5) 
2 2 needs to be satisfied. 
Therefore if the payoff to incumbents decreases substantially upon the introduction of 
additional firms (y(6)- y(5) and y(5)- y(4) respectively) and infrastructure costs are 
high (c), then it is unlikely that there will be competitive entry into the market. 
Intuitively, we would expect an outcome in which there are only four licenses being 
issued: infrastructure costs, as mentioned previously, are significant, the cost of 
building the network alone without any overhead being several billion Euro. 
Additional capacity seems to be valuable: Telly-DI and D2, the two largest 
incumbents currently controlling about 80%49 of the market, would have to shed 
customers due to capacity constraints under a six license outcome. Under such an 
outcome, they would only be able to service 60% of the market between them, using 
the full capacity of 2xlO MHz each. 
It is hence on the results of this model that Jehiel and Moldovanu suggested before the 
auction was held in Germany that "the chosen auction format cannot yield an efficient 
allocation since it is subtly biased in favour of the four incumbents currently offering 
second generation services. New entry is practically impossible, even if the design 
seems flexible enough to allow it.,,50 
49 according to http://www.handytarife.de. Telly-DI and D2 together have 40milIion out of the 48 
million subscribers in Germany 
50 lehiel and Moldovanu (2000), A Critique of the Planned Rules for The German UMTSIIMT-2000 











It comes as a big surprise, then, that the auction result was very much at odds with the 
prediction made by the two mathematical economists. The German UMTS auction 
ended in the sale of six licenses of 2xlO MHz each, two new entrants successfully 
entering the market. In one of the cases of new entry, Mobilcom, it was not as 
surprising that there was successful entry, since this company is already active in the 
fixed line market and as a "virtual" mobile operator and thus already has a customer 
base and most likely lower costs of building the network and of acquiring customers. 
The other successful new entrant into the German mobile telephony market was 
"Group 3G", a consortium including Telefonica of Spain and Finnish Sonera, so far 
not represented in the market. This successful entry was certainly more surprising 
since it did not have the advantages Mobilcom has. 
Naturally, the question to ask is why these bidders were able to deny incumbents to 
keep the status quo. It is certainly difficult to assess this question accurately without 
further research. There are, however, some factors which were not included in the 
analysis of Jehiel and Moldovanu and which the author would like to present without 
any claim of accuracy. Firstly, in the case of Mobilcom, the model certainly 
overestimated the cost of entry for the company due to the fact that they are already 
active as a "virtual operator", thus having an existing customer base and back end 
structure in place. Secondly, there may be some synergies of being able to offer fixed 
line, internet and mobile services together, as many of the bigger telecom companies 
try to place themselves as complete solution providers. These have also been ignored 
in the specification suggested by the authors. 
The above synergies are not applicable to Group 3G, however. This consortium does 
not have any existing business in Germany, thus making it much more costly for them 
to acquire customers and to build their own network. There must be other 
explanations for their success in the bidding process. One explanation that lends itself 
is that founded upon the role of the German market in Europe: with 82 million 
inhabitants and its central geographic location, the German market seems to have 
great strategic importance for telecommunications providers. It may be therefore that 
. the Group 3G may be prepared to buy a license at a price where their operations in 
Germany will not be profitable, but will create strategic spill-overs that benefits their 












The puzzle of unexpected entry under expectedly prohibitive conditions remains 
unanswered even if the tentative explanations offered above are correct. The Austrian 
regulator chose to auction UMTS licenses very much in the same way as the German 
authorities. Once again, 12 license blocks of 2 x 5 MHz paired frequency were for 
sale, a minimum of two had to be acquired for a license and anyone bidder could 
purchase a maximum of three. Six licenses were awarded after two days and 14 
rounds of bidding, the bids only totalling €706 million, though, an amount far below 
expectations. 
Next to the incumbents, there was successful entry into the market, although doubts 
have been voiced already whether a country of only 8 million inhabitants could 
support this number of UMTS providers. The puzzling thing about this auction is that 
Austria seems unlikely to have a particularly important strategic role to play in the 
European market, thus warranting unprofitable entry by competitors. 
One explanation for this outcome may lie with the small size of the country: as 
Austria only has 8 million inhabitants, a 2xlO MHz license is relatively much larger 
than an equally large one in Germany. Thus there may be a much lower demand for 
additional capacity by the players. Hence the incumbents did not continue to bid to 
force the entrants out of the market. 
These examples show that choosing the correct number of licenses is a crucial 
ingredient in the design of the auction. Most importantly, it has to be recognised that 
the playing field is far from level with the incumbents holding significant advantages 
over potential entrants. The effects of these advantages may be unclear, and the 
outcomes from the auctions may not be as uncompetitive as expected, like the 
German example showed. Mistakes in the choice of the number of licenses can be 
numerous and the effects tend to be severe. 
3.3.2 Collusion 
UMTS licenses have proved to be very valuable, extracting large license fees from 
operators in the markets around Europe. Accordingly, the incentive to reduce the 
competition for these licenses is large and may lead to collusive behaviour by 
competitors. It is clearly in the interest of the authorities to ensure that there is no 











Experience from the Netherlands51 and Italy have shown that the occurrence of 
collusion is by no means hypothetical. In both cases, participating parties of the 
auction were accused of having acted in a collusive manner and of having inhibited 
the competitive outcome of the auction. 
In the case of German licensing, the measures taken were twofold: on the one hand, 
severe penalties were proposed in case of discovery of collusive behaviour, and on the 
other hand, the conduct during the auction was closely monitored. 
To avoid any communication between bidders, the bidding parties were put III 
separate rooms, entering their bids on a computer. Only one phone and fax line was 
allowed for communication with the head quarters and a representative of the 
authority was present in the room at all times. 
As to the penalties, the rules stipulated52 that in case of discovery of collusion, the 
licenses could be revoked and the license fee be kept as a penalty. This would ensure 
that the payoff of collusion would be significantly reduced and would thus keep 
incentives low. Even if this penalty may not have been enforceable in its entirety, 
bidders would have had to expect a very high penalty when being caught, whilst at the 
same time being faced with a high risk of discovery. 
It is difficult to determine whether collusion has in fact taken place, due to the 
multitude of possibilities for collusive behaviour. In the Dutch case, two competitors 
met on the morning the auction was opened, triggering an investigation by the 
authorities into any "illegal" agreements they might have made53, since one of the 
competitors, Versatel pulled out of the race, leaving 5 companies pursuing 5 licenses. 
Collusion hence remains one of the biggest dangers for the success of any multi 
license auction, but also one area in which rules are difficult to set due to the 
multitude of ways to collude and the difficulty of enforcement. Draconic penalties in 
the case of discovery might help to prevent some of the collusive behaviour by 
reducing payoffs to the colluding parties. 
51 Klemperer (2000), The Flaws of a Dutch Auction 
52 REG-TP (2000), Entscheidung der Prasidentenkammer vom 18.2.2000 tiber die Regeln ftir die 
Durchfiihrung des Versteigerungsverfabrens zur Vergabe von Lizenzen von UMTS/IMT-2000; 
Mobilkommunikation der dritten Generation p.23 











3.3.3 Risk Related Issues 
Prior to the license auctions in Europe, the Third Generation of mobile telephony was 
hailed as a huge chance for companies to tap new revenue pools, since the much more 
limited GSM standard already had lead to a boom in the telecommunications sector. 
Once the auctions were completed, however, observers did realise that revenues from 
telephony services would no longer suffice to cover the huge fixed costs of license 
fees, especially in the face of increased competition in most countries. The 
competitiveness of the British and Gennan auctions in particular meant that providers 
had to rely on revenue models which are very much dependent on proceedings from 
data volumes. This seems risky, considering that mobile multimedia applications have 
not yet been introduced and the uptake by consumers is unclear. The UMTS forum, 
for example, estimates that by the year 2005, the European market will raise revenues 
of $10,9 billion through three areas of non-voice service: Mobile Intra-lExtranet 
Access, Multimedia Messaging Services and Customised Infotainment54. As the 
report points out, "[d]ata services for the mass market are virgin territory for the 
mobile industry,,55, hence making predictions about uptake and usage difficult. 
Potential inhibiting factors, mainly based on user expectations are pointed out 
thereafter, illustrating that there is considerable uncertainty about future revenues in 
the industry. 
Statements made by NTT DoCoMo about the multimedia capabilities of 3G networks 
have compounded this. NTT holds a leading role in mobile Internet, since it has 
already introduced "I-mode" in Japan, a predecessor to full 3G services, and will, in 
addition to this, be one of the first countries to introduce fun UMTS. Mr Enoki, in 
charge of running I-mode, is quoted as saying: "[tJhe conclusion is that we will 
perhaps offer short video clips of 10 to 15 seconds and previews of music that people 
can purchase to download at horne through their PCs or TVSt!S6, since they deem 3G 
technologies as unsuitable to offer full delivery of videos and other broadband internet 
applications. This is in sharp contrast to expectations in Europe, where mobile 
operators hope to raise a lot of their revenues through such non-voice services. 
54 UMTS Forum (2000), Report No.9: The UMTS Third Generation Market - Structuring the Service 
Revenue Opportunities p.81 
55 Ibid. p.95 











The above examples serve to illustrate the degree of uncertainty about the profitability 
of the Third Generation mobile services in the face of huge fixed costs. Briefly after 
the statements made by NIT DoCoMo, the first difficulties materialised for the 
upcoming providers: Mobilcom of Germany and Hutchinson 3G which is building 
lJMTS networks in the UK and Germany both had difficulty raising the finance for 
their networks 57 . 
Although only very little extra information became known during or after the 
licensing rounds and the high license costs had been anticipated in the industry, the 
general public saw the outcome of these allocations as dangerous for the future of 
many telecommunications companies, and the success of UMTS in general. The 
reactions in the media may be described as less than rational under these 
circumstances, and it may thus be valid to include the bounded rationality in planning 
the licensing process. 
Overall, the competitiveness of the licensing process has lead to a big increase in the 
risk associated with telecommunications operations. It even prompted a cautionary 
mentioning in the Bank of England financial stability report, which warned about the 
risk downgrading of telecommunication borrowers and the possibility of failures in 
the industr/8. Though it seems that the licensing in any single country did not suffice 
to destabilise multinational operators, the fact that most of the countries of the world 
licensed their Third Generation mobile networks in the same year may have had 
enough of an impact to achieve this. 
The licensing process, although not responsible for the bidding behaviour by 
competitors, may have to take into account its effects on the long-term stability of the 
sector. Accommodation through the modification of payment plans, i.e. by spreading 
them out over a certain period of time, might help to reduce the risks ex-ante, as more 
information about the profitability of Third Generation services becomes known in 
the time closer to market introduction. 
Theory has provided reasons for the use of auctions m the allocation of radio 
spectrum. It remains important, though, to design the licensing process carefully and 
57 Financial Times (2000), Financial problems at Mobilcom and Hutchison 











to adapt it to local market conditions. It is the uniqueness of the South African 
conditions that make the design of the licensing process a delicate operation and thus 











4 Designing the South African UMTS licensing 
process 
South Africa's UMTS licensing process is more complex than that of most other 
countries. Not only will the policymaker have to deal with the "usual" considerations 
of whether to use a beauty contest or an auction and how to design these, but also 
there are further factors that are relevant in this situation. On the one hand, the post 
apartheid government has formulated a set of objectives for economic empowerment 
of previously disadvantaged groups in society, and on the other hand, there are 
marked disparities in infrastructure between different regions and areas that make 
universal service considerations particularly important. 
I will now investigate the different factors affecting the design of the South African 
UMTS licensing process and their impact on the outcome. 
4. 1 Revenue Generation 
Although the generation of revenue for government is not at the forefront of 
objectives publicised by policy makers in most countries, the possibility to boost 
government income has made it a big consideration in the design of the licensing 
process. 
4.1.1 Auction versus Beauty Contest 
From a point of view of pure monetary benefit for the government, a highly 
competitive auction will certainly raise the highest revenue. This is necessarily the 
case as license applicants are better able to judge the worth of such a UMTS license 
than the government, and a well designed auction will reveal the true license value 
through the bidding behaviour of competitors. The French case has shown that when a 
government tries to approximate the revenues of an auction in a beauty contest 
scenario, it will either under-price the licenses and receive sufficient applications or 











received for the four license on tender59, after the price of the license was put at FF 
32,5bn (€4,9bn), payable over a period of 15 years. 
As a consequence, the government does not only have to change the license 
conditions and deal with the delay created by a new beauty contest being started, but 
it also has to face the loss in credibility caused by having to change its ruling. 
In South Africa, delays created by challenges to the beauty contest for the Third GSM 
license have created enormous financial and reputation costs: on the one hand, the 
potential operator is foregoing revenue due to the inability to commence service, and 
on the other hand, investment certainty has experienced a distinctive setback, as 
investors begin to lose patience with policy makers. 
4.1.2 Open versus Sealed Bid Auctions 
When it comes to auction design to maximise proceedings, a first price sealed auction 
would be maximising, but certainly not prudent. As discussed earlier, this method of 
auctioning causes the so-called "winner's curse" phenomenon, in which the winner is 
the one that overestimated the license value the most and may thus run into financial 
troubles, jeopardising not only the success of the Third Generation network rollout, 
but also the future of the company. Therefore, it is advisable to choose a simultaneous 
ascending auction, in which bidders will be able to collect information about their 
competitors' valuations, hence adding to their information set and minimising the risk 
of paying a price for the license that is too high. 
Within the framework of a simultaneous ascending auction, it will be the aim to 
attract a large number of serious bidders. On the one hand, the auctioneer will need to 
ensure that there are no trivial bids, such as in the Australian case, on the other hand, 
it is beneficial to attract a large number of bidders to the auction to avoid an outcome 
as in the Dutch or Swiss UMTS auctions60, where the number of bidders equalled the 
number of licenses and made any bidding for the licenses trivial. 
59 Owen (2001), French consider concessions on 3G payments 











4.1.3 The Number of Licenses 
Hence one of the prerequisites for a maximisation of government revenue will be to 
choose a license number which is different from the number of incumbents. A lower 
number will certainly spawn great competition for the licenses, but this seems short-
sighted, as decreased competition will have negative effects in the market afterwards. 
When increasing the number of licenses to more than the number of incumbents, the 
question remains how many licenses to issue. For once, the number of possible 
licenses is limited by the amount of spectrum available for UMTS61 , and furthermore, 
with increasing competition the licenses will lose value, hence decreasing the amount 
bidders will be willing to pay for these licenses. If the number of licenses should be 
increased too far, this may actually decrease the revenues to the government, since the 
value may drop more sharply as more competitors get licensed and there may not be 
sufficient meaningful bidders to keep the auction competitive. 
The last remaining option would be to choose a model similar to the German or 
Austrian model62, where license applicants bid on frequency blocks, leaving it to the 
bidding behaviour of applicants whether there would be four "large" licenses of 
2x15MHz of paired frequency, five licenses consisting of two large licenses and three 
small licenses of 2xlO MHz, or six licenses of 2xlO MHz of paired frequency. 
In both cases where it was used, six licenses were awarded, but these results cannot 
hide the fact that there is an anti-competitive component in this licensing method, 
described earlier with the help of the model created by Jehiel and Moldovanu63• It 
may well be the case that in the South African context, a less competitive outcome 
would prevail, which may have undesired consequences on the competition side. 
Apart from the licensing mechanism, in which the auction seems to be the more 
efficient mechanism in generating revenue, almost all other factors affect the amount 
of money government will be able to reap from the auction. 
61 UMTS Forum (1999), UMTS Forum Reports 1-6: Executive Summary p.14 
62 Financial Times (2000), 3G Country Information 












4.1.4 Non-Auction Factors 
Firstly, empowerment conditions attached to the license will certainly affect the 
revenue streams. The more network operators have to invest in affirmative training or 
sourcing programs, the higher their cost base will be, as it reduces the competition on 
the sourcing side when sourcing from an empowerment partner makes switching 
difficult or impossible. Training programs will also increase cost, as empowerment is 
aimed at disadvantaged people who by definition do not have the same level of 
training as employees hired on the free market. A higher cost base will reduce the 
profit that can be derived from a UMTS 1icense, hence reducing the license price that 
bidders are willing to pay. 
A similar argument applies for Universal Service obligations, since there the 
contributions to the Universal Service Fund or the coverage of uneconomic areas will 
reduced profitability once again and hence reduced the willingness of bidders to pay. 
Therefore a government interested in the maximisation of revenue should design an 
auction which is competitive and has the "right" number of licenses on offer. All 
factors that decrease profitability ex-post will reduce the revenue stream that can be 
generated. It has to be noted, though, that the benefits from increased service levels 
and higher human capital in the economy may well have a higher net present value for 
the economy than the extra revenue generated by exc1uding them. 
4.2 Black Economic Empowerment 
As in earlier licensing rounds, black economic empowerment (BEE) will playa role 
in the licensing process. Should the government choose to license through a beauty 
contest as it has done before, then the empowerment component will certainly playa 
crucial role in the assessment of license applications. As, however, many pointers lead 
us to suggest the use of an auction, the question arises as to how to inc1ude an 
empowerment component in an auction setting. There are several possibilities 
available. 
Firstly, the licensing authority could prescribe some degree of empowerment to any 
license winner, hence trying to achieve the same results as in a beauty contest. 
Clearly, it will be inefficient to let outsider decide on the empowerment option, due to 











company to make empowennent a success. It would only be a matter of time until 
disputes about the "correct" amount of empowennent would emerge. 
Secondly, government could choose to exclude empowennent from the license 
conditions. Instead, it could choose to collect some money from the license winners 
and implement some empowennent programs itself. Evidently, the component of 
transferring human capital through management training would be lost, making this 
model less attractive in tenns of empowennent than the finns implementing it 
themselves. 
Thirdly, it could hold a pre-qualification for the auction, in which applicants would 
specify their empowennent programs to the licensing authority and then be granted 
access to the auction should the empowennent plans be sufficient. This would 
guarantee the inclusion of social objectives in the license conditions and leave the 
implementation of these to the license winners, hence allowing the best possible use 
of resources. 
Considering the fact that empowennent objectives will certainly play an important 
role in the license design, a pre-qualification for the auction by ways of a beauty 
contest seems desirable, however there may be credibility problems for the regulator 
once again, if applicants who are denied access may choose to sue against their 
exclusion, as the license losers did in the case of the third South African cellular 
license. 
Apart from choosing the best way of administering a chosen degree of empowennent, 
the licensing body has to be aware of the effects of empowennent issues on the 
outcome of the auction. 
As noted in the discussion of revenue generation, imposing a higher level of 
empowennent will lead to increased cost and hence decrease revenues from the 
auction. Furthennore, empowennent programs to date have not only been of the fonn 
of sourcing and human resource development. Share ownership plans have also been 
used. In MTN, the empowennent shareholding is at 21,76%, in Vodacom 5% and for 
Telkom a 10% empowennent shareholding is envisaged for the future64• 











These empowerment shareholding programs have, in the past, suffered from a lack of 
capital among the group to receive the empowerment holding or from the difficulty of 
accessing capital on the open market. In the case of E-TV, for example the 
empowerment shareholding scheme failed due to a lack of capital. 
Lastly, when designing the empowerment program, it may be important to consider 
the size of the South African capital market and the consequences of the licensing 
process on it. In Europe there were already concerns about the destabilising effects of 
excessive lending to the telecommunication sector65 , voiced in a financial stability 
review by the Bank of England. If the South African licensing should extract large 
amounts of capital from the market, then the empowerment shareholders may well 
find it very difficult to raise funds for their empowerment projects. This situation may 
well be exacerbated by other privatisations of state owned enterprises. In the process 
of liberalisation of the fixed line market for example, Telkom will most likely be 
transferred into private ownership. This type of constellation would lead to further 
pressure on capital markets, making financing, especially for empowerment programs, 
more expensive. In this case, careful timing of the capital streams for the licenses and 
the empowerment shareholding would be important. Alternatively, it would be a 
possibility to exclude empowerment ownership programs and replace them entirely 
with sourcing and human resource development programs. 
Hence when implementing the empowerment objectives of the licensing process, 
different conflicting objectives will have to be weighed-up against each other. Larger 
economic empowerment programs will reduce auction revenues. Furthermore, the 
manner of implementation is important, as it has a crucial impact on the success of 
empowerment programs. Lastly the timing of license fee financing is important with 
respect to share ownership programs, as the flooding of capital markets with 
telecomrn debt may inhibit the successful implementation of empowerment share 
ownership programs. Thus it seems useful to design empowerment programs with a 
view to the other sectors of the economy. Should pressure on capital markets have 
increased due to other SOEs being privatised, then a shift towards more operational 
empowerment seems usefuL 











More operationally focussed empowerment programs could be created by replacing 
some of the financial aspects with employment and human capital formation 
programs. Through employment and training of members from disadvantaged black 
communities, redistribution and empowerment could be promoted without being 
subject to the pressures of financial markets. 
4.3 Universal Service Obligations 
Similarly to black economic empowerment objectives, universal service obligations 
are certain to have an impact on the outcome of the licensing process. Again, they will 
tend to increase cost for license winners. 
There are different models available for the imposition of universal service 
obligations. As in earlier licenses, it is possible to charge an annual fee on the license 
which will be used to finance universal service components of community projects. 
This model will increase the cost base of license holders and hence decrease 
profitability. Once again, it would mean that auction revenues would be lower than if 
such universal service obligations were excluded. It is important to note that at the 
macroeconomic level, the loss in license revenue will be mitigated by increased 
growth prospects due to improved infrastructure in the country. 
Parallel to considerations about the best way of implementing the empowerment 
agenda, one might suggest that the government should rather concentrate on imposing 
minimum targets for universal service and leave it up to the network operators as to 
how to implement them. This would certainly leave some leeway to find the most 
efficient way of achieving the universal service obligation. On the other hand, it may 
also lead to a deepening of infrastructure inequalities, since it is difficult to ensure that 
network operators do not avoid areas where servicing is more costly. SATRA, for 
example, notes that the community telephone obligations imposed upon MTN and 
Vodacom did lead to an increase in such facilities but lead to a skewed distribution of 
community service phones as there was no location spread included as a criterion for 
servicing66. 
The question remains, however, whether a universal service obligation is necessary 
for 3G services or not. The aim of the universal service authority is to provide basic 











telecommunications services, which 3G certainly does not represent. It would hence 
be possible to argue that a universal service obligation is not necessary for this new 
market, similar to internet service providers: here, there is no universal service 
obligation for the market. 
It quickly becomes apparent that the most efficient way of solving the universal 
service component may not be the most desirable due to incentive incompatibilities 
between network operators and the public set of objectives. Administering it more 
directly may lead to a better outcome from a social point of view, as the loss of 
efficiency of administrative procedure could be compensated by a socially more 
desirable distribution of servicing. 
Once again, in designing the license the conflict of different objectives becomes 
apparent. Achieving social goals of infrastructure improvement in under serviced 
areas will conflict the quest for efficiency and government revenue. The fact that the 
incentives of network operators and do not coincide with social objectives of 
universal servicing may lead the licensing body to administer the servicing of 
underdeveloped areas more closely than in the past. This form of universal service 
administration would imply that a yearly fee would be raised to finance the planning 
and a certain number of government specified projects would have to be entered into 
by network operators. 
4.4 Competition Considerations 
Jehiel and Moldovanu have, as discussed in earlier sections, suggested that increased 
competition will lead to decreased market prices and hence to increased efficiency. It 
is therefore desirable from a competition point of view to maximise the number of 
licensees, as long as entry is economically viable. Due to the large fixed costs inherent 
in a mobile telephone network and the limitations on bandwidth available, there will 
be a fairly small number of licenses that can be operated economically. In Germany, 
which has an estimated number of 48 million subscribers67 at the moment, six licenses 
were awarded. South Africa, on the other hand, has 8 million mobile telephone 
subscribers68, forecast to grow to 15 million by 2015. Additionally, the big physical 
67 http://www.handytarife.de 











size of the country means that possibly only a lower number of operators will be 
viable. The extent to which entry is economically viable will have to be determined 
by a more detailed study which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Some caveats have to be voiced, though. When auctioning the licenses, it is important 
to attract new entrants, as mentioned earlier. This implies that auctioning a number of 
licenses equal to the number of incumbents, most likely three by then, assuming that 
Telkom will only be active in the market through it's joint-venture Vodacom, will 
lead to entrants refraining from bidding and the auctioning process becoming trivial. 
Furthermore, as was also mentioned earlier, having a large number of competitors in 
the market may lead to lower total revenues, due to the decreasing license value to 
each individual network provider. 
One last question with regards to competition considerations is the possibility of 
phasing-in competition as the market becomes bigger. This has effectively been the 
policy in South Africa, as MTN and Vodacom had the first licenses and the third 
cellular license was only to be introduced in 1999. There is a crucial difference 
between the development of the GSM and the UMTS market, though. When GSM 
telephony was introduced in South Africa, it was the first time that cellular telephones 
were becoming small and affordable enough to create a large market. The 
development of the market did take a longer period of time, since the networks had to 
be built from scratch and the company infrastructure also had to be created. The 
UMTS networks, on the other hand, will present an extension to existing services. 
Telephones might well be downward compatible69, such that roaming onto GSM 
networks may be possible when leaving the coverage area of Third Generation 
services, and indeed the German license conditions demand this of network providers. 
In some countries, for example the United Kingdom, where UMTS licenses have 
already been awarded, new entrants were allowed to roam on other national GSM 
networks, to secure speedy entry into the market and to reduce incumbents' 
advantages over new entrants. 
The market size that can be serviced through a Third Generation mobile phone license 
will therefore be considerably bigger from when networks take up their service than 
69 REG-TP (2000), Entscheidung der Prasidentenkammer vom 18.2.2000 tiber die Festlegung und 











in the case of OSM networks. This reduces the need for the phasing-in of competition 
and strengthens the argument to introduce all competitors at once. Not only will new 
entrants have less difficulty catching up with OSM incumbents due to the lower 
market power they have in the UMTS market, not having established themselves there 
yet. Furthermore, customers will benefit from a more competitive market structure, 
giving them more benefits in terms of product variety, innovation, choice and price. 
Especially the big innovation of 30 networks, namely value added services, will be 
more viable in a larger market. The benefits of licensing all competitors 
simultaneously and to maximise entry are large and justify the extra risk of failure 
created through tougher competition. 
4.5 Reputation Issues for the Regulator 
SATRA, and its descendant ICASA have had a relatively brief history with respect to 
mobile telephone regulation. By some assessments, the handling of the third OSM 
licensing process has destroyed a lot of reputation on the part of ICASA. The fact that 
the authority was unable to prevent litigation following its ruling on the winner of the 
beauty contest have raised concerns about the feasibility of using further beauty 
contests to allocate licenses in the telecommunications sector. 
Following the allegations of prejudice and incompetence in the third OSM license 
debacle, a very transparent allocation process would be beneficial for the industry and 
the reputation of the regulator. An article in the Sunday Times 70 points out that 
investors interested in building mobile telephone infrastructure worth R 6 billion are 
disillusioned by the deadlock created in the OSM licensing issue. Not only has the 
delay caused large revenue losses for the eventual winner of the license, but also has it 
created extra costs in the bidding process and left infrastructure providers without the 
business platform they envisaged when the license winner was about to be named. 
The problems mentioned point towards the use of an auction. Should the government 
choose to license using an auction mechanism, any disputes about the manner of 
auctioning would have to be resolved before the start of the auction itself. Once this 
has been achieved, though, it would be possible to allocate the Third Generation 
licenses in a transparent and impartial manner, which would restore confidence in the 











regulator and allow for certainty in the investment climate. This would be important, 
due to the explicit statement made by the government about its aims of attracting 
foreign direct investment and the growth possibilities the telecommunications sector 
holds. Should the government on the other hand choose a beauty contest as in the 
GSM case, this might cause decreased interest in the licenses, due to the additional 
costs caused by uncertainty about the timeframe and outcome. This will be the case 
since companies taking part in the beauty contest will expect the process to fail just as 
it did in the case of the Third GSM license. 
Reputation arguments certainly point to the use of an auction. The track record of 
South Africa's regulator is not good enough to warrant the use of another beauty 
contest, risking that UMTS has a bad start. 
4.6 Industry Health and Risk Related Issues 
"Fear what you wish for, for it might come true." This Chinese proverb reflects the 
reactions by policy makers in some European countries. Auctioning mechanisms were 
much criticised when they failed, but when they succeeded, concerns were also 
voiced. In the case of Germany and the UK, for example, the competitiveness of the 
allocation process did lead to such high license fees that operators had difficulty 
financing their license fees 71 and there was a cautionary report about the effects on 
financial stability of increased lending to telecomm companies issued by the Bank of 
England72• If South Africa should succeed in creating a competitive licensing 
mechanism, the macroeconomic effects of this might well mitigate some of the 
efficiencies introduced. 
Borrowing by network operators has caused concerns even in the large European 
market, hence one might expect effects to be more pronounced in the South African 
context. Especially since the Asian crisis, capital has tended to flood back to the core 
from developing countries, reducing liquidity. It is therefore possible that large 
license fees, caused either by an auction or a high reserve price under a beauty 
contest, would lead not only to a absolute, but also a relative increase in the cost of 
capital for telecomm providers. 
71 Financial Times (2000), Financial problems at Mobilcom and Hutchison 











This perceived higher risk may also be based on the situation of the South African 
economy: being a developing country and having recently undergone major economic 
and political changes, it is more difficult for investors to gauge the security of the 
investment environment. Higher risk in comparison to highly developed countries 
means that there will already be lower revenues from the auctions and less demand for 
licenses. 
Increased capital cost and a higher default risk will have a negative effect on the 
development of the mobile market, both in the UMTS and the GSM segment. This is 
caused by the fact that actors in the GSM market are likely to be license winners in 
the UMTS market, too, as outlined in section 4. The very high costs from auctions in 
Europe have decreased the flexibility of telecomm companies, since some of them 
have reached a liquidity constraint73, inhibiting them from developing business as 
actively as they did before. Additionally, the end of Telkom's monopoly will create 
further demand for financing, as fixed line entrants will need to finance their rollouts, 
too. A highly competitive situation in the mobile market could therefore crowd out 
activities in the fixed line business. 
The pressure on the financial markets could be eased by phasing license payments 
over a few years, hence decreasing the shock of increased borrowing on the financial 
markets. A similar solution has already found its use in the GSM licenses, when MTN 
and Vodacom had the choice of paying their R 100 million license fees at once or in 
instalments, where interest was charged on the amounts paid at later dates 74. This 
flexibility would reduce some of the risk associated with the uncertainty over future 
profitability. In case of some of the competitors struggling to pay, the government 
could allow a delay to avoid the destabilising effects of a failure of one of the UMTS 
providers. Another possibility for the reduction of risk would be the delay of the 
auction until reliable data became available from other markets. This would mean, 
though, that South Africa would be foregoing the possibility to launch into 3G 
markets early and to benefit from the development of the market. 
73 Financial Times (2000), Financial problems at Mobi1com and Hutchison 
74 Department of Posts and Telecommunications (1993), Issue of Licenses to Provide National Cellular 











South Africa's comparatively smaller financial market and the risk related issues that 
European economies have experienced after the license auctions suggest the inclusion 
of some cautionary measures in the license design to avoid any shocks or uncertainty 
problems. The possibility of phasing license payments seems attractive and may even 












South Africa is at the threshold of Third Generation mobile telephone services. This 
new technology offers great opportunities the entire economy. Network providers 
may use the new markets to expand and thus further economic growth and 
employment. Downstream service providers will be provided with new market 
opportunities similarly to web service companies when the Internet created new 
markets. Companies from other industries can benefit, too, from the new marketing 
and transaction possibilities entailed in this new technology. Consumers should also 
benefit from higher quality telephony and the creation of new value-added services. 
Experience from South Africa and many other countries has shown that the starting 
point which is given to such a new market can impact its development significantly. 
Thus the design of the licensing process for the UMTS market is very important, 
putting the definition of objectives to be achieved with the licensing as well as the 
choice of the licensing mechanism at the heart of the matter. 
Four types of license allocation have been used before: giving licenses away to 
licensees of the policy maker's discretion, distributing licenses by lottery, choosing 
license winners through a beauty contest or the use of different types of auctions. 
Most likely, one of the latter two allocation mechanisms will be used in South Africa. 
Beauty contests have been known and applied for a long time, whereas auctions have 
become fashionable only relatively recently. 
The different mechanisms fulfil the different objectives of licensing with varying 
success. 
The first objective, but in the political process not necessarily the most important 
objective, of the licensing process is to identify the most efficient users of the radio 
spectrum on offer and to allocate the licenses to these companies. Economic theory 
and examples from the USA and Europe have shown that auctions can be more 
efficient than beauty contests in this respect. The fact that in an auction, the bidders 
ultimately identify the winners makes this system powerful. Beauty contests will 
always suffer from the fact that policy makers will have to decide who the winners of 












Design intricacies pose a threat in the use of auctions, as the wrong choice of a single 
detail such as the wrong number of licenses or the wrong bidding mechanism may 
destroy the entire auction. The great number of auctions that has been executed in 
UMTS licensing until the time of writing does provide potential auction designers 
with ample guidance to avoid design failures and thus makes it very well possible to 
implement an auction successfully. Design intricacies should therefore not put off 
policy makers from choosing an auction as their method of choice. 
Apart from the quest for the identification of the most efficient license winners, this 
paper identified other objectives that influence the choice of the allocation mechanism 
significantly. 
Revenue generation has been at the forefront of many governments, once it became 
apparent in the UK auction that large sums could be raised for government through 
the sale of 30 licenses. In this respect, an efficient auction is likely to generate higher 
revenues than the allocation through a beauty contest, since under a competitive, 
efficient auction, the price of a license will be equal to the present discounted value of 
supernormal profits expected. In a beauty contest scenario, the licensing body will be 
prone to choosing a price that is either too high or too low. Should the price be too 
high, there will not be sufficient demand for the licenses, and should prices be set too 
low, revenue to the government would not be maximised. 
On the objective of black economic empowerment, the issue is far from clear-cut. If a 
beauty contest were to be used, then companies would outline their empowerment 
programs to be implemented upon license acquisition. Although this kind of 
agreement often is difficult to enforce, it would leave it up to the most efficient parties 
in the process to implement the black economic empowerment programs, namely the 
companies themselves. 
Was an auction to be used, then the implementation of a black economic 
empowerment program would be more difficult. Different options for the 
implementation of black economic empowerment programs have been discussed, and 
it appears that using a pre-qualification mechanism which would force companies to 
formulate empowerment programs and to have them approved by the licensing 











The next objective on the agenda of policy makers is that of universal service. A 
universal service obligation would most likely be implemented through a universal 
service fund, in which the license holders would have to pay a certain amount every 
year and which would finance government-specified telecommunications programs 
aimed at universal service. These programs would most likely be concerned with 
fixed line networks and GSM networks, which in comparison to UMTS networks 
provide a more "basic" service. This form of universal service contribution has been 
tried and tested in South Africa before, which means that authorities are likely to 
choose the model again. Its implementation would mean that the sum eventually paid 
by license winners would be lower under an auction scenario, but policy makers will 
be aware that deferred earnings will be received at a later stage. 
Competition considerations are going to be important, too. There will be at least three 
GSM networks by the time UMTS licenses will be awarded. From a competition point 
of view, licensing the maximum number of competitors is desirable, though it has to 
be investigated ex ante whether it is realistic to license four or five companies. 
Whether or not companies like Telkom will also be able to bid next to their 
engagement in Vodacom will determine the number of incumbents, and regulation 
about roaming in 2G networks will change the value of the licenses to companies not 
holding a GSM license. 
Once the "correct" number of licenses has been established, which will make any kind 
of allocation mechanism competitive, then the use of an auction is preferable from a 
competition point of view, as it forces companies to identify the most competitive 
bidders rather than letting government reach this conclusion. 
With regards to reputation issues for the regulator, using an auction is clearly 
preferable, since it is highly unlikely that the regulator will be able to allocate licenses 
without being challenged by companies who did not get chosen. Designing a well-
functioning auction mechanism under the public eye would help to reinstate a lot of 
credibility for the regulator and allow telecomm licensing in South Africa to move on 
from the fiasco of the third GSM license. 
The last aspect, which might prevent the government from choosing an auction to 











payments in Europe, due to the hype associated with 30 networks, have put 
considerable pressure on the telecommunications sector. 
As the South African auction would take place at a later date, prices would most 
likely be more realistic, given that people have realigned their expectations about the 
profits to be made from UMTS licenses. Hence the risk of failure and excessive 
borrowing in the sector would be lower nowadays. Furthermore, employing a model 
of phased license payments would allow the license winners to borrow less initially 
and pay the license fees plus some interest at a date when the licenses actually have 
started to generate revenues. 
The South African licensing issue is a unique and complex one due to the many 
special aspects that differentiate it from other countries. It has been shown that an 
auction mechanism would serve the South African people and their economy better 
than using another licensing mechanism, although careful deliberation is necessary to 
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